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707 
SUCKING THE AIR OUT OF WIND ENERGY: 
NUISANCE LITIGATION AND ITS EFFECT ON 
WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Global climate change is a major threat facing our country and the 
world.
1
 The consequences of climate change are likely to be significant 
and far reaching, including increasing droughts, sea-level rises and 
flooding in coastal areas, potentially adverse effects on agriculture, and 
negative effects to human health.
2
 Further, there is a general consensus in 
the scientific community that climate change is caused by human 
activities,
3
 specifically emissions of greenhouse gases from the burning of 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (Thomas R. Karl, 
Jerry M. Melillo & Thomas C. Peterson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009), available at 
http://globalchange.gov/publications/reports/scientific-assessments/us-impacts/download-the-report; 
Elizabeth Rosenthal, U.N. Report on Climate Details Risks of Inaction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at 
A1. 
 2. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 12. ―In 
projecting future conditions, there is always some level of uncertainty. . . . However, the science of 
making skillful projections at these scales has progressed considerably . . . .‖ Id. at 10. While ―many 
crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide and low levels of warming, . . . higher levels 
of warming often negatively affect growth and yields.‖ Id. at 71. Other adverse effects on agriculture 
include increased ―[w]eeds, diseases, and insect pests‖ affecting crops and ―reduce[d] livestock 
productivity‖ due to ―heat, disease, and weather extremes . . . .‖ Id. Adverse effects on human health 
include: increased ―risk of illness and death related to extreme heat and heat waves‖; increased 
occurrence of ―[s]ome diseases transmitted by food, water, and insects‖; and higher levels of pollen, 
adversely affecting allergy sufferers. Id. at 89. 
 3. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2008) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT] (―Most of 
the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to 
the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.‖). Two studies demonstrate the scientific 
community‘s consensus that climate change exists and is caused by humans. The first was a study 
published in the journal Science. The author looked at 928 papers written on the subject that appeared 
in peer-reviewed scientific journals over a ten-year period. She found that ―[r]emarkably, none of the 
papers disagreed with the consensus position.‖ Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific Consensus on Climate 
Change, 306 SCI. 1686, 1686 (2004). In a more recent study, two University of Illinois–Chicago 
researchers surveyed over 10,000 earth scientists and asked them two questions:  
 1. When compared with pre-1800s levels, do you think that mean global temperatures 
have generally risen, fallen, or remained relatively constant? [and]  
 2. Do you think human activity is a significant contributing factor in changing mean 
global temperatures?  
 . . . . 
 . . . [Ninety] percent of the participa[ting scientists] answered ―risen‖ to question 1 and 
82% answered yes to question 2. 
Peter T. Doran & Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, Examining the Scientific Consensus on Climate 
Change, EOS, Jan. 20, 2009, at 22, 22–23. Despite the general consensus in the scientific community, 
some Republican leaders in the United States believe that climate change does not exist or, if it does, 
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fossil fuels.
4
 Due to the potential consequences of climate change, the 
international community has been trying and continues to try to reduce 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
5
 In the United States, members 
of Congress continue to seek legislation that would address climate change 
by creating a cap-and-trade system, capping greenhouse gas emissions at a 
gradually reducing level and creating a market for the sale and purchase of 
emission credits.
6
 The President has made reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions a priority as well, ordering the federal government to do so.
7
 
 
 
that it does not have anthropogenic causes. See, e.g., Michael B. Farrell, GOP’s Global Warming 
Rumble: Sarah Palin v. Arnold Schwarzenegger, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 16, 2009, available 
at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/1216/GOP-s-global-warming-rumble-Sarah-Palin-v.-
Arnold-Schwarzenegger. Also, it appears that a growing number of Americans doubt the existence of 
climate change. A poll from late 2009 found fifty-one percent, down from seventy-one percent in 
2007, of American adults believe carbon dioxide will lead to global warming. Nathanial Gronewold & 
Christa Marshall, Rising Partisanship Sharply Erodes U.S. Public’s Belief in Global Warming, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/03/03climatewire-rising-partisanship 
-sharply-erodes-us-public-47381.html. A wide ―partisan gap‖ exists with ―73 percent of Democrats 
believ[ing] that greenhouse gas emissions cause global warming, compared to 28 percent of 
Republicans and 49 percent of independents.‖ Id. In contrast, ―90 percent of Europeans view global 
climate change as a ‗serious problem‘. . . .‖ Id.  
 4. IPCC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (―Global increases in CO2 concentrations are due primarily 
to fossil fuel use . . . .‖). 
 5. In 1997, thirty-seven nations signed the Kyoto Protocol, a binding agreement to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The United States never ratified the protocol, so it was never bound to 
reduce its emissions. In addition, developing countries had no obligations under the agreement. See 
Charles J. Hanley, Climate Talks End with Eye on Next Year, ABCNEWS.COM, Dec. 19, 2009, http:// 
abcnews.go.com/print?id=9379026; Fiona Harvey, Ed Crooks & Andrew Ward, All Eyes Turn to the 
US and China, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at 3. At the end of 2009, world leaders met in Copenhagen 
to try to create a new agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. Tom Zeller, Jr., Fault Lines Remain 
After Climate Talks, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 4, 2010, at Finance 18. In the end, only a nonbinding 
accord was reached, which was widely seen as inadequate to address the problem of climate change. 
President Obama remarked:  
I think that people are justified in being disappointed about the outcome in Copenhagen. . . . It 
didn‘t move us the way we need to. . . . The science says that we‘ve got to significantly 
reduce emissions over the next—over the next 40 years. There‘s nothing in the Copenhagen 
agreement that ensures that that happens. 
Id. 
 6. In 2009, the House passed the American Clean Energy and Security (Waxman-Markey) Act 
of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). For a summary of the bill, see STAFF OF H. COMM. ENERGY 
& COMMERCE, 111TH CONG., THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (H.R. 2454) 
(Comm. Print 2009), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_ 
housesummary.pdf. However, the Waxman-Markey bill failed to gain support in the Senate. In the 
spring and summer of 2010, Senator John Kerry spearheaded an effort to find compromise in the 
Senate on climate change legislation, in part by reducing the reach of the cap-and-trade regime, but he 
ultimately failed. See Perry Bacon Jr., Kerry’s Lonely Push on Climate Change, WASH. POST, July 27, 
2010, at A15. Many economists believe that a more efficient and simpler means to reduce carbon 
emissions is by instituting a carbon tax, but such proposals have garnered even less support in 
Congress. John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions Faces a Steep Climb, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A13.  
 7. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,114 (Oct. 8, 2009). Under the order, each agency is 
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Another priority of the President is to reduce the United States‘ 
dependence on foreign sources of energy
8
 and, in the wake of the BP oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico, fossil fuels generally.
9
 He is not alone; 
national leaders of both parties since the 1970s have expressed a desire to 
end the United States‘ ―addiction‖ to oil and to make the country energy 
independent.
10
 The United States imports roughly sixty percent of its oil, 
and this is believed to create significant problems, including ―adding to the 
trade deficit,‖ ―national security threats,‖ and ―wild price swings‖ in 
energy.
11
 The spilling of almost five million gallons of oil into the Gulf of 
Mexico and the as-of-yet untold environmental destruction from the BP oil 
spill illustrate that domestic fossil fuel production carries with it the 
potential for problems as well.
12
  
Wind energy is a clean, alternative source of energy that does not 
create greenhouse gas pollutants and can be produced domestically.
13
 
While wind energy accounts for roughly only one percent of the energy 
produced in the United States,
14
 the potential for wind energy is vast.
15
 
―[Wind] [r]esources in the contiguous United States, specifically in the 
central plain states, could accommodate as much as 16 times total current 
demand for electricity in the United States.‖16 By obtaining more energy 
from wind, the United States could significantly reduce greenhouse gas 
 
 
required to take inventory of all its greenhouse gas emissions and develop a plan to reduce them by 
2020. Id. at 52, 117–18. 
 8. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Energy (June 29, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-
Energy/). 
9. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill 
(June 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
nation-bp-oil-spill). 
 10. DAVID SANDALOW, FREEDOM FROM OIL: HOW THE NEXT PRESIDENT CAN END THE UNITED 
STATES‘ OIL ADDICTION 1–3 (2008). Whereas general political consensus exists on the issue of energy 
independence, there is not political consensus on the issue of global climate change. See Farrell, supra 
note 3. 
 11. SANDALOW, supra note 10, at 3. 
 12. See Plug in Gulf Well is Declared a Success, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A12; Remarks by 
the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill, supra note 9. 
 13. Wind Power and Climate Change, AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, http://www. 
awea.org/documents/factsheets/Climate_Change.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter AWEA]. 
 14. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP‘T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, at 7 tbl.1.2 
(2010). Fossil fuels, alternatively, accounted for almost seventy-eight percent of energy production in 
the United States in 2009. Id. 
 15. See Xi Lu, Michael B. McElroy & Juha Kiviluoma, Global Potential for Wind-Generated 
Electricity, 106 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. 10,933 (2009), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/ 
106/27/10933.full.pdf.  
 16. Id. at 10,933. This study relied on atmospheric data to analyze the potential amount of energy 
that could be produced by wind if a ―network of . . . turbines‖ were placed in ―non-forested, ice-free, 
nonurban areas‖ of the United States. Id.  
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emissions and slow the effects of climate change.
17
 In addition, increased 
wind energy could reduce the United States‘ reliance on foreign energy 
and fossil fuels.
18
 However, litigation aimed at enjoining the construction 
of wind energy facilities slows and increases the cost of potential wind 
energy development.
19
 Often, this litigation is based on the common-law 
doctrine of nuisance
20
 and reflects a ―not in my backyard‖ attitude.21 This 
 
 
 17. See AWEA, supra note 13. Despite the potential benefits for the planet of wind power, it has 
faced some opposition from environmental advocates. See, e.g., Christina Gillham, Birds vs. 
Environmentalists?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/12/birds-vs-
environmentalists.html. 
Critics charge that wind-energy development can cause habitat fragmentation—a 
displacement of a species that can eventually reduce its numbers—as well as the deaths of 
birds and bats (a species that is especially vulnerable due to its low reproductive rates) that 
collide with the wind turbines‘ massive rotor blades. A 2007 study by the National Academy 
of Sciences puts the number of birds killed each year at about 20,000 to 30,000. 
Id. Some conservational and bird-watching groups recognize the positive effects of wind energy on 
global climate change and advocate finding a balance between wind development and conservation, 
advocating the siting of wind farms in a way that limits the impact on wildlife. See, e.g., Birds and 
Wind Farms, AM. BIRD CONSERVANCY, http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/collisions/wind_ 
farms.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2011); Wind Power Overview, NAT‘L AUDUBON SOC‘Y, 
http://policy.audubon.org/wind-power-overview-0 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). In addition, the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service‘s Wind Turbines Guidelines Advisory Committee has drafted 
recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior on ―how best to assess and prevent adverse impacts 
to wildlife and their habitats while allowing for the development of the Nation‘s wind energy 
resources.‖ WIND TURBINE GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMM., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WIND 
TURBINE GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, at i (2010), available at http:// 
www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/Wind_Turbine_Guidelines_Advisory_Committee_Reco
mmendations_Secretary.pdf. 
 18. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President Challenging Americans to Lead the 
Global Economy in Clean Energy (Oct. 23, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/remarks-president-challenging-americans-lead-global-economy-clean-energy). 
 19. See Lisa Wing Stone & Sarah Zdeb, Lessons Learned from Wind Farm Litigation, 11 ENVTL. 
LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE NEWSL. 2, 5 (2009) (―[P]roponents and developers of wind energy 
projects defending . . . [against] litigation can face significant costs and project delays . . . .‖); see also 
Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & 
POL‘Y J. 281, 283–90 (2007) (recounting the multiple rounds of litigation aimed at stopping the Cape 
Wind project). 
 20. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Rassier v. Houim, 
488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992); Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App. 2008); Burch 
v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 2007). The use of nuisance law to delay 
what is widely seen as environmentally beneficial is a bit ironic, given that ―[t]he nuisance cause of 
action provides the backbone of common law environmental (pollution) litigation.‖ Roger Meiners & 
Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 923, 926 (1999). ―Historically, nuisance law was dealing with ‗pollution‘ problems long before 
Congress enacted the current array of environmental statutes.‖ Fredric D. Bellamy, Environmental 
Nuisance Claims—Conflation and Contradiction in an Area Dominated by Statutes, in TOXIC TORT 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS: ADVANCED CIVIL LITIGATION 221, 223 (1997). 
 21. Although people often appreciate the social utility of wind energy, they dislike the idea of a 
wind-generation device being placed near their home—hence the term ―not in my backyard.‖ See, e.g., 
Richard G. Jones, Windmill Cuts Bills, but Neighbors Don’t Want to Hear It, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2007, at B1.  
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Note addresses the issue of nuisance claims against wind energy 
development and proposes a way to reduce litigation and thus speed the 
development of wind energy, fulfilling the twin goals of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on foreign oil.
22
  
This Note contains five parts. Parts I–III introduce the legal issues 
involved in nuisance litigation against wind farms. Part I provides an 
overview of the common-law doctrine of nuisance.
 23
 Part II briefly 
discusses some of the relevant statutory law affecting wind farms and their 
placement.
24
 Part III examines the relevant case law, looking at the 
primary cases of nuisance litigation against single wind generators
25
 and 
wind farms.
26
 Part IV begins by analyzing the case law discussed in Part 
III and describes which types of nuisance suits are most likely to prevail.
27
 
Part IV finishes with a discussion of the effects of nuisance suits, 
including their effect on the development of wind energy, regardless of the 
outcome.
28
 After a discussion of right-to-farm statutes,
29
 which serve as an 
imperfect model to my proposal, Part V proposes how immunity from 
nuisance litigation for wind farm developers could be formulated at the 
state level by creating right-to-wind statutes.
30
 
I. COMMON LAW 
A. Private Nuisance 
Nuisance law is a common-law doctrine, having its roots in the assize 
of nuisance, which originated in England nearly 900 years ago.
31
 As 
opposed to the doctrine of trespass, which occurred when a defendant 
actually entered the plaintiff‘s land, the assize of nuisance was for the 
defendant ―who interfered with plaintiff‘s use and enjoyment of his 
property by acts done elsewhere than on plaintiff‘s land . . . .‖32 The 
modern doctrine of private nuisance appears to trace its origin to the assize 
 
 
 22. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 8. 
 23. See infra Part I. 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part III.B. 
 27. See infra Part IV.A. 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
 29. See infra Part V.A. 
 30. See infra Part V.B. 
 31. 9 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.01(1) (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 
2009). For a historical account of the development of the assize of nuisance, see Janet Loengard, The 
Assize of Nuisance: Origins of an Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1978). 
 32. POWELL, supra note 31. 
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of nuisance, as the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private 
nuisance as ―a nontrespassory invasion of another‘s interest in the private 
use and enjoyment of land.‖33  
Not all interference,
34
 however, rises to the level of a private nuisance. 
For a successful action, ―the interference must be substantial and the harm 
significant.‖35 ―[A]s Dean Prosser . . . noted, ‗[t]he law does not concern 
itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances and 
disturbances of everyday life in a civilized community . . . .‘‖36 The 
standard used to measure the interference is whether a normal person or 
normal property in the neighborhood would consider the harm 
significant.
37
  
B. Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance has historical roots in a crime called a purpresture, 
which was an ―‗encroachment[] on the king‘s right‘‖ and involved an 
action such as an ―‗obstruction of roads, non-repair of bridges, [or an] 
interference with light . . . .‘‖38 Today, a ―public nuisance is an 
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.‖39 Of 
the two types of nuisance, litigants against wind farms generally pursue 
private nuisance, so public nuisance need not be discussed further.
40
 
 
 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979).  
 34. Although the Restatement uses the term ―invasion,‖ id., ―interference‖ is commonly used as 
well. See POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.02(1). 
 35. Id. § 64.02(2) (footnote omitted). 
 36. Id. (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 88 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979). Thus, ―hypersensitive persons or 
property‖ will not have a claim unless a normal person or property in the community would consider 
the harm significant. Id. § 821F cmt. d.  
 38. POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.01(1) (quoting E. GARRETT & H. GARRETT, LAW OF 
NUISANCES 1–2 (3d ed. 1908)). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
 40. See Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Rassier v. Houim, 488 
N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992); Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 2007) 
(discussed infra Parts III.A.1; III.A.2; and III.B.1 respectively). But see Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 
266 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App. 2008) (plaintiff made a public nuisance claim, but it was dismissed at 
the trial level; discussed infra Part III.B.2). The pursuit of private nuisance claims in these cases is 
consistent with the nature of the harm—these plaintiffs all allege harm to them personally or their 
property. They likely do not allege a public nuisance because doing so would require them to show an 
interference with a right held by the public. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/4
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C. Balancing Test 
Courts generally utilize a balancing test when evaluating a case 
alleging a nuisance.
41
 Although the articulation of the test varies somewhat 
by state,
42
 it generally involves weighing the seriousness of the harm 
caused to a neighbor against the social utility of the activity causing the 
harm.
43
 Where the harm caused outweighs the social utility, a nuisance 
occurs.
44
 To determine the seriousness of the harm, several factors are 
considered, including: 
 (a) [t]he extent of the harm involved;  
 (b) the character of the harm involved;  
 (c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or 
enjoyment invaded; 
 (d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to 
the character of the locality; and  
 (e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
45
 
To determine the social utility or value of the activity alleged to cause 
the harm, additional factors are considered: ―(a) the social value that the 
law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of 
the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of 
preventing or avoiding the invasion.‖46 
D. Defense of “Coming to the Nuisance” 
If a plaintiff successfully shows that the harm caused by the activity 
outweighs the social utility of the activity, he or she will have established 
 
 
 41. See, e.g., Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 887. 
 42. Compare Rose, 453 A.2d at 1381 (―‗The utility of the defendant‘s conduct must be weighed 
against the quantum of harm to the plaintiff.‘‖ (quoting Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, 149 
A.2d 599, 605 (N.J. 1959))), with Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 887 (―‗An interference with the private use and 
enjoyment of another‘s land is unreasonable when the gravity of the harm outweighs the social value 
of the activity alleged to cause the harm.‘‖ (quoting Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 198 (W. 
Va. 1989))).  
 43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). 
 44. Id. 
 45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979).  
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1979). As to be expected, different courts give 
different weight to the various factors. See discussion infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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a nuisance.
47
 The defendant, however, can raise one of several defenses.
48
 
Of importance to this Note is the defense of ―coming to the nuisance.‖49 
The basic argument is that the defendant was conducting the activity 
alleged to cause a nuisance before the plaintiff acquired the nearby 
property—hence, the plaintiff ―came to the nuisance.‖50 If the defendant 
can successfully prove the ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense, it does not 
usually serve as a complete bar to recovery for the plaintiff, but becomes a 
factor weighed in favor of the defendant when the court makes its 
decision.
51
 For farmers, the ―coming to the nuisance‖ defense has been 
codified in the form of right-to-farm laws in all fifty states.
52
 However, the 
right-to-farm legislation is stronger than the ―coming to the nuisance‖ 
defense because it usually provides immunity from nuisance actions.
53
 
E. Remedies 
Plaintiffs in nuisance actions generally pursue injunctions or damages 
as a remedy.
54
 ―The usual basis for equitable intervention—the inadequacy 
of the remedy at law—is normally present in a private nuisance action.‖55 
Monetary damages can be awarded at the ―election of the plaintiff‖ or by 
the decision of the court to deny equitable relief.
56
 In cases against wind 
generators and farms, injunction is the typical remedy sought.
57
 Further, 
wind farms often face anticipatory nuisance claims, which a plaintiff 
 
 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979). 
 48. POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.05. 
 49. Id. § 64.05(2). Others include acquiescence, estoppel, statute of limitations, a prescriptive 
right to continue the activity, and compliance with local zoning regulations. Not all of these serve as 
complete bars to recovery, but as factors to be weighed in the balancing test. Id. § 64.05. 
 50. Id. § 64.05(2). 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Harrison M. Pittman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Right-to-
Farm Acts, 8 A.L.R.6TH 465, 480 (2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 170–73 (further 
discussing right-to-farm statutes). 
 53. Pittman, supra note 52, at 465. 
 54. POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.07(1). 
 55. Id. § 64.07(2)(a). At the same time, a court may deny relief based on ―such traditional 
equitable principles as laches.‖ Id. § 64.07(2)(b) (footnote omitted). 
 56. Id. § 64.07(3). Determining damages can be complicated, but ―[w]hen the harm is permanent, 
damages are measured by the decrease in the fair market value of the property attributable to the 
private nuisance.‖ Id. (footnote omitted). 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 72, 102, 123.  
―[S]ubstantial interferences with a person‘s use and enjoyment of property by things such as 
noise and unsightliness can best be abated by courts applying equitable principles. This is due 
to the fact that constant loud noise and unsightliness that interferes with the use and 
enjoyment of property simply are not susceptible to computation.‖ 
Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 894 (W. Va. 2007). 
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brings before the nuisance has even commenced and before the plaintiff 
has experienced any harm.
58
 
II. STATUTORY LAW 
Although the statutory law affecting wind farms is largely beyond the 
scope of this Note, there are a few key points worth mentioning. First, 
there are few states that provide mandatory guidance on the siting of wind 
farms outside of urban areas.
59
 However, several states are beginning to 
provide nonmandatory guidance on the siting of wind farms in their 
jurisdictions.
60
 Occasionally, local governments create ordinances that 
affect the siting of wind farms.
61
 Such ordinances may require the issuance 
of a permit before developers of wind farms may begin construction.
62
 
III. CASE LAW 
Relatively few cases have addressed the issue of nuisance law with 
regard to wind energy. The following four cases are the only published 
cases that exist on the subject.
63
 As wind energy continues to expand in the 
 
 
 58. POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.07(2)(d). See Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 889 (allowing an 
anticipatory claim to proceed); see also Muscarello v. Ogle Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 610 F.3d 416, 424 
(7th Cir. 2010) (dismissing as unripe an anticipatory nuisance claim).  
 59. See Smith, supra note 19, at 299. ―Except in urban areas, where zoning and building 
regulations may impose restrictions on wind turbines, the siting and location of utility-grade wind 
plants are left almost entirely to the discretion of wind companies and individual landowners.‖ Id. at 
282. 
 60. For a discussion on ways that states are creating wind farm siting guidelines, an analysis of 
said guidelines, and a proposed comprehensive guideline, see Robert S. Guzek, Note, Addressing the 
Impacts of Large Wind Turbine Projects to Encourage Utilization of Wind Energy Resources, 27 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 123, 133–38 (2008). 
 61. As of December 2008, at least twenty-five local governments in Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah had enacted ordinances for the siting of 
wind farms. F. OTERI, NAT‘L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., AN OVERVIEW OF EXISTING WIND ENERGY 
ORDINANCES (2008), available at http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/policy/2008/ordinances 
_overview.pdf; see, e.g., MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24.06(2) (2007). In addition, several 
states have drafted model ordinances, which can be adopted by local governments in their states. For a 
link to the model ordinances, as well as local ordinances, see U.S. Dep‘t of Energy, Wind Energy 
Ordinances, WIND POWERING AMERICA, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/siting/ordinances.asp 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010).  
 62. See, e.g., MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24.07(3) (2007). 
 63. A fifth case, Muscarello v. Ogle County Board of Commissioners, 610 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 
2010), includes a nuisance claim against a wind farm development; however, I do not discuss it in 
detail as it never reached the merits of the nuisance claim. Id. at 418. In that case, a homeowner sued 
over the issuance of a zoning permit for a proposed wind farm. Id. at 419. The court dismissed her 
nuisance claim as not ripe because no wind turbines had been constructed yet, so no invasion could 
have occurred. Id. at 424. News reports show other instances of lawsuits against wind farms where the 
plaintiff made a nuisance claim. See, e.g., Kathy Mellott, Judge Backs Gamesa in Noise Lawsuit, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:707 
 
 
 
 
coming years,
64
 it is likely that more cases will emerge, providing a richer 
body of law on this subject.  
A. Cases Involving a Single Wind Generator in a Residential Setting
65
 
1. Rose v. Chaikin
66
 
In Rose v. Chaikin, the plaintiff and defendant were neighbors in a 
―contiguous residential neighborhood in Brigantine, New Jersey.‖67 ―[I]n 
an effort to save on electric bills,‖ the defendant ―erected a 60‘-high 
tower‖ with a wind generator on top, ―ten feet from the property line of 
one of [the] plaintiffs.‖68 When operational,69 the wind generator produced 
noise in the range of fifty-six to sixty-one decibels, making noise 
described as similar to a ―large motor upon which there is superimposed 
the action of blades cutting through the air.‖70 The noise made by the wind 
generator caused the plaintiff to suffer physical symptoms and interfered 
with daily activities.
71
 Thus, the plaintiff brought a nuisance action seeking 
to enjoin the operation of the wind generator.
72
 
 
 
TRIB.-DEMOCRAT (Johnstown, Pa.), Dec. 9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 23613300; Stuart R. 
Wahlin, Lawsuit Ensures Wind Farm Won’t Be a Breeze, ROCK RIVER TIMES (Rockford, Ill.), Feb. 3, 
2010, available at http://rockrivertimes.com/2010/02/03/lawsuit-ensures-wind-farm-won%E2%80% 
99t-be-a-breeze/. 
 64. In 2009, new wind installations increased America‘s wind energy generating capacity by 
10,000 megawatts, or ―enough to serve over 2.4 million homes[].‖ MARKET UPDATE: RECORD 2009 
LEADS TO SLOW START IN 2010, AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION 1 (2010), available at http:// 
www.awea.org/documents/factsheets/Market_Update_Factsheet.pdf. Although the rate of growth of 
wind energy development is expected to decrease in coming years, wind energy is expected to 
continue to grow. Id. 
 65. The division in my discussion between cases involving a single wind generator in a 
residential setting and cases involving an actual or proposed wind farm, see Part III.B, was first used 
by Ernest Smith. See Smith, supra note 19, at 292–93. 
 66. Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982). 
 67. Id. at 1380. Brigantine, New Jersey, is a small beach town north of Atlantic City. See 
BRIGANTINE BEACH TOURISM COMMISSION, http://www.brigantinebeachnj.com/tourism.html (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 68. Rose, 453 A.2d at 1380. 
 69. ―Although a reduction in the wind speed to below eight m.p.h. will automatically shut down 
the unit, the prevailing winds at this site are generally above that.‖ Id. 
 70. Id. For comparison, a whisper is equivalent to thirty decibels, a normal conversation 
measures around fifty to sixty-five decibels, and a hair dryer measures around seventy decibels. 
Interactive Sound Ruler, NAT‘L INST. ON DEAFNESS & OTHER COMM. DISORDERS, http://www.nidcd. 
nih.gov/health/education/decibel/decibel.asp (last updated June 7, 2010). 
 71. ―Those symptoms included nervousness, dizziness, loss of sleep and fatigue.‖ Rose, 453 A.2d 
at 1380.  
 72. The plaintiff also brought an action to enjoin the defendant based on the defendant‘s 
violation of the local zoning ordinance, which set the maximum decibels permitted at fifty. Id. This 
claim was successful, but ultimately unnecessary given the outcome of the nuisance action. Id. at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss3/4
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The court utilized a balancing test to determine whether the defendant‘s 
wind generator constituted a private nuisance.
73
 New Jersey case law 
required two elements to enjoin a noise because it constituted a private 
nuisance: ―(1) injury to the health and comfort of ordinary people in the 
vicinity, and (2) unreasonableness of that injury under all the 
circumstances.‖74 The court started by analyzing the harm to the plaintiff, 
specifically the noise created by the wind generator.
75
 It found that the 
wind generator produced noise that was ―offensive because of its 
character, volume and duration,‖ and that the plaintiff had shown 
sufficient harm for a successful nuisance claim.
76
 The court considered the 
character of the neighborhood a significant factor—the wind generator 
was especially bothersome given the tranquility of the neighborhood.
77
  
The court next considered the social utility of the wind generator. The 
defendant argued that alternative power from the wind generator 
contributed to a broader national policy of reducing energy consumption.
78
 
While the court lauded the intention of alternative energy, ultimately it 
concluded that the relative harm to the plaintiff outweighed the social 
utility.
79
 Thus, the court found a private nuisance existed and an injunction 
warranted because ―the social utility of [the] windmill is outweighed by 
the quantum of harm that it creates.‖80 
 
 
1384; see infra text accompanying note 80. The plaintiff joined as defendants the manufacturer of the 
wind generator, its installer, and the city, but they did not participate in the trial. Rose, 453 A.2d at 
1380 n.1. 
 73. The balancing test had the same basic outline as discussed in Part I.C of this Note. ―‗The 
utility of the defendant‘s conduct must be weighed against the quantum of harm to the plaintiff.‘‖ 
Rose, 453 A.2d at 1281 (quoting Sans v. Ramsey Golf & Country Club, 149 A.2d 599, 605 (N.J. 
1959)).  
 74. Rose, 453 A.2d at 1381 (citing Malhame v. Demarest, 392 A.2d 652, 658 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1978)). 
 75. The defendant argued ―noise, standing alone, cannot constitute a private nuisance . . . ,‖ but 
the court quickly rejected this argument. Rose, 453 A.2d at 1381. 
 76. Id. at 1382. 
 77. Id. The court further argued that plaintiffs had selected this location because of its proximity 
to the beach and the related natural sounds, so the ―noise of [the wind generator], which would be 
unwelcome in most neighborhoods, [was] particularly alien [t]here.‖ Id. 
 78. Specifically, the defendant pointed to two federal pieces of legislation, the Wind Energy 
Systems Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9201–13 (2006), and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006). Rose, 453 A.2d at 1382. 
 79. ―[T]he fact that a device represents a scientific advance and has social utility does not mean 
that it is permissible at any cost.‖ Id. at 1382. 
 80. Id. at 1383. The court noted that this holding should not be read to mean that all wind 
generators are a nuisance, only that the facts of this case ―clearly and convincingly establish[ed]‖ one. 
Id. 
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2. Rassier v. Houim
81
 
The defendant in Rassier v. Houim ―erected a tower and installed a 
wind generator on his residential lot in . . . Mandan[,] [North Dakota] in 
1986.‖82 Two years later, the plaintiff bought the neighboring lot and 
moved a mobile home onto it, placing her house approximately forty feet 
from the defendant‘s tower with the wind generator.83 At that range, an 
environmental scientist and an engineer measured the noise emanating 
from the wind generator at roughly fifty to sixty-nine decibels.
84
 The 
plaintiff alleged the noise made use of her yard impractical.
85
 She also 
alleged that the wind generator was a safety hazard, as large chunks of ice 
could fall off the blades.
86
 In 1990, approximately two years after moving 
onto the property, the plaintiff brought an action claiming the defendant‘s 
wind generator constituted a private nuisance.
87
 The district judge rejected 
the plaintiff‘s claims, and she appealed.88 
The court first outlined nuisance law, which, in North Dakota, is 
statutory, as opposed to common, law.
89
 The nuisance action in North 
Dakota tracks a negligence action in that a plaintiff must show a duty and 
breach.
90
 ―The duty which gives rise to a nuisance claim is the absolute 
duty not to act in a way which unreasonably interferes with other persons‘ 
use and enjoyment of their property.‖91 To determine whether someone 
 
 
 81. Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992). 
 82. Id. at 636. Mandan is located in central North Dakota, across the Missouri River from 
Bismarck, North Dakota. Its population is just over 18,000, but it is part of the Bismarck metropolitan 
area, which has a population over 100,000. See CITY OF MANDAN, http://www.cityofmandan.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 83. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 636, 638. 
 84. Id. at 638. Mandan had no noise ordinance proscribing noise above a certain level. The court 
noted that the standard elsewhere in North Dakota is a maximum of fifty-five decibels in residential 
areas, so the defendant‘s wind generator would have violated such an ordinance. Id. For a better 
understanding of the windmill‘s fifty to sixty-nine decibel production, see supra note 70.  
 85. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638. Expert testimony at trial also maintained that ―noise at the 
measured levels could be irritating, stressful, and interfere with sleep.‖ Id. 
 86. Plaintiff testified that she had once found such a chunk of ice in her yard. Id. 
 87. Id. at 636. The plaintiff also claimed the defendant had violated restrictive covenants placed 
on the property by the developer. The trial court judge found these covenants had been abandoned and 
were no longer enforceable. Id. at 639. 
 88. Id. at 636.  
 89. The common law is still applicable, though, so long as it does not conflict with the statutory 
law. Id. In practice, North Dakota still applies a balancing test. See infra text accompanying note 92. 
 90. See Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 636–37. 
 91. Id. at 637. Specifically, the nuisance statute proscribes failing to perform a duty when the 
failure ―‗[a]nnoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others.‘‖ Id. at 636 
(quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-01-01 (1992)). 
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has failed to perform this duty, the court weighs factors that are found at 
common law.
92
 The court placed particular importance when weighing 
factors on the common-law doctrine of coming to the nuisance, finding it 
weighed heavily in the defendant‘s favor.93 Based on a weighing of the 
coming to the nuisance factor and the other evidence presented,
94
 the court 
concluded that the trial court was not ―clearly erroneous‖95 in its factual 
finding that a nuisance did not exist and upheld the lower court.
96
 
B. Cases Involving an Actual or Proposed Wind Farm 
1. Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC
97
 
The defendant
98
 in Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC sought to 
develop a wind farm in Grant County, West Virginia, along a fourteen-
mile-long strip of the Allegheny Front.
99
 The proposal called for 200 wind 
turbines, each 210–415 feet in height with blades 115 feet in length.100 
Three years prior to the lower court‘s decision, the defendant obtained ―a 
certificate of convenience and necessity,‖ a siting ―certificate required for 
the operation of wholesale electric generating facilities‖ in West Virginia, 
from the Public Service Commission (PSC).
101
 The plaintiffs, 
 
 
 92. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 637. 
 93. Id. at 638; see discussion supra Part I.D.  
 94. The court specifically mentioned that it took the plaintiff two years to bring suit, that no other 
neighbor complained of the sound, and that there were safety features that mitigated the potential 
problem of ice throws. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638. 
 95. Clearly erroneous is the standard of review on factual issues. Id. at 638 (citing N.D. R. CIV. 
P. 52(a) (1992)). 
 96. Rassier, 488 N.W.2d at 638–39. The trial court used the coming to the nuisance factor as its 
stated reason for denying the claim. Id. at 638. It is worth noting that two of five justices on the North 
Dakota Supreme Court dissented from this opinion. Justice Meschke, writing for himself and another 
justice, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority‘s discussion of the law, 
but disagreed with its weighing of factors. Id. at 639 (Meschke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Specifically, he thought the trial court and the majority weighed too heavily the coming to the 
nuisance factor. Id. He would have focused more on the ―character of the locality.‖ Id. at 640. He 
believed that the coming to the nuisance factor ―should not be applied to an inappropriate activity that 
interferes with the use of property planned, zoned, and dedicated to residential purposes.‖ Id. He 
would have remanded the decision for a weighing of factors that took greater account of the residential 
nature of the neighborhood where the plaintiff and defendant lived. Id. at 641. 
 97. Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 2007). 
 98. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, was the defendant company that planned to construct the 
wind farm. Also, a defendant was Shell WindEnergy, Inc., which contracted to purchase the farm after 
its construction. Id. at 884–85. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 885. 
 101. Id. at 884 & n.1. The PSC has ―the authority and duty to enforce and regulate the practices, 
services and rates of public utilities‖ in the state. Id. at 887 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 24-1-1(a) (1986)). 
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―homeowners who live[d] . . . about one-half mile to two miles from the 
projected wind turbines,‖ brought a private nuisance claim against the 
defendant seeking to enjoin construction of the wind farm.
102
 The lower 
court dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claim, and they appealed.103 
The first issue the court addressed was whether the granting of the PSC 
certificate immunized the defendants from nuisance liability.
104
 The 
defendant argued that allowing a nuisance action against an electricity 
generation facility would ―conflict[] with the role of the PSC in granting 
siting certificates to these facilities.‖105 The court disagreed.106 While the 
PSC took account of several factors before granting a siting certificate,
107
 
it did not consider the interests of the neighboring homeowners and the 
effect that the placement of an electric generating facility would have on 
their ―use and enjoyment of their propert[y].‖108 Since the PSC did not 
consider the homeowners‘ interest, the court found that nuisance law was 
still ―necessary to preserve the traditional rights of these landowners.‖109 
The court next considered whether the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts 
that, if proven, would prove a nuisance claim and entitle the plaintiffs to a 
prospective injunction.
110
 With respect to the potential noise from the wind 
 
 
Before granting the certificate, the PSC held a hearing with public notice and comment. Id. at 884 n.2. 
―[T]he PSC concluded as a matter of law that the facility will be ‗an economically beneficial, 
environmentally responsible wind power facility‘ that will help to address the need for ‗additional 
generating capacity‘ and will help ‗diversify . . . the regional energy supply.‘‖ Id. at 884 n.2.  
 102. Id. at 885. 
Specifically, the [plaintiffs] asserted that they [would] be negatively impacted by noise from 
the wind turbines; the turbines [would] create a ―flicker‖ or ―strobe‖ effect when the sun is 
near the horizon; the turbines [would] pose a significant danger from broken blades, ice 
throws, and collapsing towers; and the wind power facility [would] cause a reduction in the 
[plaintiffs‘] property values. 
Id.  
 103. Id. at 884. 
 104. Id. at 886–91. 
 105. Id. at 889. It was also argued that ―the circuit court lack[ed] jurisdiction to enjoin the 
construction . . . of [the wind] facilities under [the] law of nuisance‖ because the ―Legislature granted 
the PSC the power to decide the siting of electric generating facilities.‖ Id. at 886. The court rejected 
this argument because it could find no evidence in the authorizing statute that the legislature meant to 
―disregard or abrogate the common law doctrine of nuisance.‖ Id. at 889. 
 106. Id. The dissent reached an entirely different conclusion, finding that NedPower, by the PSC‘s 
certificate, was a public utility. Id. at 898 (Benjamin, J., dissenting). As a public utility, NedPower had 
the power of eminent domain and could not be subjected to an injunction based on private nuisance. 
Id. at 899. 
 107. The PSC considered the ―‗interests of current and future utility service customers, the general 
interests of the state‘s economy and the interests of the utilities subject to its jurisdiction.‘‖ Id. at 889 
(majority opinion) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 24-1-1(b) (1986)). 
 108. Id. at 889. 
 109. Id.  
 110. The circuit court found that even if the alleged injuries developed, they would ―not support a 
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farm, the court concluded based on case law that noise, by itself, would be 
sufficient to establish a nuisance.
111
 With respect to the claim that the 
windmill would create a ―‗flicker‘ or ‗strobe‘ effect,‖ the court found that 
aesthetics alone usually provided insufficient grounds for a nuisance 
claim, but when paired with other interferences, an injunction could be 
granted.
112
 The court similarly found that an alleged diminution in 
property values, without more, would not qualify as a nuisance.
113
 
However, if coupled with ―interferences to the use and enjoyment of . . . 
property,‖ the diminution in property value could be sufficient for an 
injunction.
114
 Having found the plaintiffs ―alleged sufficient facts . . . to 
avoid a dismissal,‖ the court reversed and remanded the case for a hearing 
on the plaintiffs‘ claims.115 The court noted, however, that to obtain a 
prospective injunction, ―‗it must be shown that the danger of injury from 
[the prospective nuisance] is impending and imminent, and the effect 
certain.‘‖116  
 
 
prospective injunction because the injuries are speculative and contingent.‖ Id. at 891. 
 111. Id. ―‗[E]very person . . . has the right not to be disturbed in his house; he has the right to rest 
and quiet and not to be materially disturbed in his rest and enjoyment of home by loud noises.‘‖ Id. 
(quoting Snyder v. Cabell, 1 S.E. 241, 251 (W. Va. 1886)). 
 112. Id. at 891–92. The court pointed to an earlier case where it held that a salvage yard was a 
nuisance because, in addition to ―‗unsightliness,‘‖ the yard was noisy, ―‗hazard[ous] from the presence 
of flammable materials,‘‖ infested with ―‗rodents and insects,‘‖ and negatively affecting the property 
value of its residential neighbors. Id. at 892 (quoting Mahoney v. Walter, 205 S.E.2d 692, 693 (W. Va. 
1974)).  
 113. Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 892. Interestingly, an extensive study of almost 7,500 home sales in 
nine states conducted by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory found no evidence that proximity 
to wind facilities adversely affected home values. BEN HOEN ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY NAT‘L LAB., U.S. DEP‘T OF ENERGY, THE IMPACT OF WIND POWER PROJECTS ON 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES: A MULTI-SITE HEDONIC ANALYSIS 75 
(2009); Press Release, Lawrence Berkeley Nat‘l Lab., Berkeley Lab Study Finds No Widespread 
Impact of Windpower Projects on Surrounding Residential Property Values in the U.S. (Dec. 2, 2009), 
available at http://newscenter.lbl.gov/press-releases/2009/12/02/wind-power-property-values/  (―‗Neither 
the view of wind energy facilities nor the distance of the home to those facilities was found to have 
any consistent, measurable, and significant effect on the selling prices of nearby homes.‘‖ (quoting 
Ben Hoen)).  
 114. Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 892. Alternatively, the plaintiff could seek monetary damages for the 
loss of value to his or her property. Id.  
 115. Id. at 895. The court argued it cannot predict the outcome of the claim, but indicated that the 
siting certificate will be ―persuasive evidence of the reasonableness and social utility‖ of placing a 
wind farm on the site. Id. According to local news reports, the plaintiffs ultimately failed to stop 
construction of the NedPower wind farm, though as of February 15, 2009, the ―suit [was] still kicking, 
after bouncing to the state Supreme Court and back.‖ Jim Balow, Recession Takes Sales Out of Wind; 
Wind Turbines Multiply Across Ridgetops, but May Slow Down, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), 
Feb. 15, 2009, at P1E. 
 116. Burch, 647 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Pope v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 43 S.E. 87, 87 (W. Va. 
1903)). The court distinguished this case, where a nuisance could be found based on the facts of the 
case, with a nuisance per se—something that is a nuisance at all times. Id. at 892–93. An unlawful 
business like a brothel is the ―classic example‖ of a nuisance per se. Id. at 893 n.9. A business that is 
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2. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC
117
 
In Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, the defendants
118
 had constructed and 
were operating the Horse Hollow wind farm, the largest wind farm in the 
world.
119
 Horse Hollow is located in Taylor County, Texas
120
 and contains 
421 wind turbines that are 400 feet tall and occupy an area of 47,000 
acres.
121
 The plaintiffs,
122
 neighbors of the wind farm, brought an action 
alleging nuisance and seeking injunctive relief.
123
 The defendants filed for 
a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted, and the 
plaintiffs‘ final nuisance claim lost at trial by jury.124 The plaintiffs 
appealed the summary judgment.
125
 
The primary issue addressed on appeal was whether the district court 
judge properly dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claims with regard to the wind 
farm‘s aesthetic impact.126 After analyzing the case law of Texas, the court 
found no Texas court had ever found a nuisance based only on aesthetic 
impact, and ―successful nuisance actions typically involve an invasion of a 
plaintiff‘s property by light, sound, odor, or foreign substance.‖127 While 
 
 
lawful cannot be a nuisance per se. Id. at 892. Since the PSC approved the wind farm‘s construction, it 
was lawful and therefore not a nuisance per se. Id. at 893. 
 117. Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App. 2008). For a more thorough 
discussion on the effect of Rankin on Texas nuisance law, see Kristina Culley, Note, Has Texas 
Nuisance Law Been Blown Away by the Demand for Wind Power?, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 943, 950–67 
(2009). 
 118. There were multiple defendants: FPL Energy, LLC, and its apparent subsidiaries. Rankin, 
266 S.W.3d at 508. The plaintiffs also originally sued the owners of the property that housed the wind 
farm but dismissed them prior to trial. Id. at 508 n.2. 
 119. Press Release, Lynn Tillotson & Pinker LLP, Lynn Tillotson & Pinker LLP Announces 
Defense Verdict In Lawsuit Against Largest Wind Farm in the World (Apr. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.openpr.com/news/13928/Lynn-Tillotson-Pinker-LLP-Announces-Defense-Verdict-In-Law 
suit-against-Largest-Wind-Farm-in-the-World.html. 
 120. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 508. Taylor County is located in the north central plains of Texas—
the center of the state geographically. See TAYLOR COUNTY, http://www.taylorcountytexas.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). Horse Hollow is located roughly twenty miles southwest of Abilene, Texas, the 
largest city in Taylor County. See id.; Press Release, Lynn Tillotson & Pinker LLP, supra note 119. 
 121. See Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 511; Press Release, Lynn Tillotson & Pinker LLP, supra note 
119. 
 122. Plaintiffs consisted of seventeen individuals and a corporation. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 508 
n.1. 
 123. The plaintiffs alleged public, as well as private, nuisance claims, but no public nuisance 
claim went to trial. Id. at 508. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Plaintiffs also appealed the exclusion of witnesses and expert testimony. The defendant 
raised a cross issue involving the taxing of costs to the plaintiffs. Id. 
 126. Id. The trial judge also instructed the jury that it could not consider the aesthetic impact of 
the wind farm in determining the nuisance. Id. 
 127. Id. at 509. The court noted that 
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the plaintiffs conceded that an aesthetic claim standing alone would not 
constitute a nuisance, they argued that the aesthetic impact should be 
considered when combined with other factors.
128
 The court rejected this 
argument as a ―distinction without a difference.‖129 The plaintiffs also 
argued that their ―emotional response to the loss of their view . . . 
interferes with the use and enjoyment of their property.‖130 Again, the 
court rejected this argument, finding that an emotional response could only 
support a nuisance claim where the nuisance was a nuisance per se.
131
 The 
defendants‘ actions were not a nuisance per se because the operation of the 
wind farm was lawful.
132
 Thus, the court, in upholding the lower court‘s 
summary judgment, found that a nuisance action could not be based on 
aesthetic impact or the emotional response flowing therefrom.
133
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Making Sense of the Case Law 
Based on the cases discussed in the previous part,
134
 this portion of the 
Note addresses what conditions will likely lead to a successful nuisance 
action against a wind generator or wind farm. Specifically, it first 
considers whether residential or rural actions are likely to be more 
successful, and then discusses which type of interferences are most likely 
to lead to successful nuisance actions. 
 
 
[t]he injury or annoyance which warrants relief against an alleged nuisance must be of a real 
and substantial character . . . ; for if the injury or inconvenience [is] merely theoretical . . . or 
trivial . . . , there is no nuisance in a legal sense. Thus the law will not declare a thing a 
nuisance because it is . . . unpleasant to the eye . . . , for the law does not cater to men‘s tastes 
or consult their convenience . . . . 
Id. at 510 (quoting from Shamburger v. Scheurrer, 198 S.W. 1069, 1071–72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 128. The other factors advanced by the plaintiffs were: ―the turbines‘ blinking lights, the shadow 
flicker affect they create early in the morning and late at night, and their operational noises . . . .‖ 
Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 510. 
 129. Id. at 512. ―Aesthetical impact either is or is not a substantial interference with the use and 
enjoyment of land. If a jury can consider aesthetics as a condition, then it can find nuisance because of 
aesthetics.‖ Id. at 512–13. The court‘s logic here is questionable, because it is not clear why aesthetics 
could not be a factor in a nuisance, even if it alone would not support one. The West Virginia Supreme 
Court takes the opposite view of the Rankin court. See infra text accompanying notes 114–15. 
 130. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 511. 
 131. The case law, which addressed nuisance in fact, did not support a nuisance claim based on 
―fear, apprehension, or other emotional reaction resulting from the lawful operation of industry.‖ Id. at 
512. See supra note 116 for an explanation of nuisance per se. 
 132. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 511. 
 133. Id. at 513. 
 134. See supra Part III. 
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Wind generators in residential areas are more likely to have successful 
nuisance claims against them than wind generators or wind farms in less 
developed areas.
135
 This is due to the close proximity of neighbors and the 
fact that ―[t]he location, character and habits of the particular community 
are to be taken into account in determining what is offensive or annoying 
to a normal individual living in it.‖136 Of course, this proposition is not 
always true, as the Rassier case indicates.
137
 However, the unique 
circumstance surrounding Rassier may explain why it came out differently 
than Rose, which found that a wind generator in a residential area was a 
nuisance.
138
 The primary reason for the discrepancy between the two cases 
was that the court in Rassier placed significant emphasis on the fact that 
the plaintiff was coming to the nuisance, and this weighed heavily in the 
defendant‘s favor.139 Had the plaintiff not come to the nuisance, her claim 
likely would have prevailed because it presented a similar fact pattern to 
the Rose case, albeit in a different jurisdiction.
140
 
Of all the possible ―nontrespassory invasion[s]‖141 that a plaintiff may 
allege, the case law suggests that a noise invasion is likely to be the most 
successful in a nuisance suit against a wind generator or wind farm.
142
 
Noise was the predominant factor in Rose that led to a successful finding 
of nuisance.
143
 The court in Burch, while not deciding on the merits of the 
 
 
 135. Compare Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (finding a wind 
generator in a residential setting constitutes a nuisance), with Rankin, 266 S.W.3d 506 (upholding the 
partial summary judgment for defendants in a nuisance action against a wind farm in a rural area). 
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. e (2000).  
 137. See supra notes 81–96 and accompanying text. The Burch case also may seem to contradict 
the notion that a nuisance suit against a rural wind farm is less likely to be successful. See supra text 
accompanying notes 97–116. However, it does not, because while the court reversed and remanded the 
lower court‘s dismissal of the claim, it did so without addressing the validity of the plaintiff‘s claims. 
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 80. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 93. Notably, the dissent would have placed less weight on 
the coming to the nuisance factor and weighed more heavily the residential character of the 
neighborhood. See supra note 96. In addition, unlike Rose and most residential communities, there 
were no restrictive local ordinances. See supra notes 72, 84. Also, the restrictive covenants, which 
would have prohibited the construction of the wind generator in Rassier, had been abandoned and 
were no longer enforceable. See supra note 84.  
 140. The level of noise produced by both wind generators was nearly identical, around the fifty-
five to sixty decibel range, although the plaintiff in Rose alleged more concrete physical harms as a 
result. See supra notes 70–71, 84–85 and accompanying text.  
 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). 
 142. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (finding a wind 
generator a nuisance because the noise it produced disturbed the plaintiff and was out of place with 
character of the neighborhood); cf. Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879, 891 (W. 
Va. 2007) (―‗[N]oise alone may create a nuisance, depending on time, locality and degree.‘‖ (quoting 
Ritz v. Woman‘s Club of Charleston, 173 S.E. 564, 564 (W. Va. 1934))). 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
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case,
144
 indicated that noise would be a significant factor in finding a 
nuisance as well.
145
 Although Rassier did not result in a successful 
nuisance claim based on noise, this can be attributed to the successful 
―coming to the nuisance‖ defense advanced by the defendant and 
recognized by the court.
146
 The success of these types of nuisance claims 
against wind generators and wind farms may become less successful as 
technology continues to improve, reducing the sound they produce.
147
 
Other invasions may result in successful nuisance claims against wind 
generators and farms, especially when there is a collection of invasions 
and the court looks at the situation as a whole.
148
 The Burch case gives a 
good indication that courts may be open to nuisance claims that consider 
factors such as: the light-strobe effect created by wind generators when the 
sun is low in the horizon;
149
 reduced property values resulting from nearby 
wind farms;
150
 and low-level noise from far-off wind farms.
151
 Since the 
Burch court did not find a nuisance, but rather reversed a summary 
judgment motion,
152
 the outcome of these types of claims, or a case which 
considered each claim as part as a larger collection of invasions, is 
uncertain.  
Finally, some invasions seem very unlikely to result in successful 
nuisance actions against wind generators or wind farms. The court in 
Rankin resoundingly rejected the idea that claims could be based in whole, 
or in part, on aesthetic grounds.
153
 The court also rejected the idea that the 
 
 
 144. See supra note 115. 
 145. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. The ultimate success of the claim based on noise 
seems questionable given that the closest defendant was a half-mile away from the nearest wind 
turbine. See supra text accompanying note 102. The sound of a wind turbine from 1000–2000 feet, less 
than the approximately 2,600 feet of the nearest defendant, is only around forty to fifty decibels, which 
is equivalent to the sound of a refrigerator running. Interactive Sound Ruler, supra note 70; see also 
W. DAVID COLBY ET AL., WIND TURBINE SOUND AND HEALTH EFFECTS: AN EXPERT PANEL REVIEW 
3-3 (2009), available at http://www.awea.org/documents/AWEA_CanWEA_SoundWhitePaper_12-11 
-09.pdf. 
 146. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 147. There have been ―major advances in technology over the last 20 years. Today‘s windmills—
often called wind turbines—are quieter and more reliable, and they generate more power at a lower 
cost.‖ Scott Kirsner, Wind Power’s New Current, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at G1. 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 112–13. But see Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 
S.W.3d 506, 512–13 (suggesting that unless an invasion would be a nuisance on its own, it cannot be 
considered as a factor in determining a nuisance).  
 149. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
 151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 127–29. It is important to distinguish aesthetic grounds 
from those related to light, like the strobe effect mentioned in Burch. See supra text accompanying 
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emotional response to aesthetic grounds could support a nuisance claim.
154
 
Despite the clear repudiation in Rankin, ―over the past few decades, courts, 
in dictum, and commentators have challenged the traditional reluctance to 
find a nuisance based solely on aesthetic grounds.‖155 Thus, it is possible 
that aesthetic challenges may still be raised in other jurisdictions. 
B. Nuisance Claims Against Wind Developers Both Slow and Increase the 
Cost of Wind Development 
Even if a plaintiff‘s lawsuit based in nuisance law against a wind 
generator or wind farm ultimately fails, the litigation slows down and 
increases the cost of wind energy development.
156
 Litigation is a 
notoriously slow process.
157
 The Cape Wind project off the Nantucket 
Sound exemplifies the delaying effect that litigation can have on a 
potential wind development.
158
 Multiple rounds of litigation against the 
developers, all of which have failed,
159
 have prevented the construction of 
the offshore wind farm since the first round of litigation in 2003.
160
 While 
the Cape Wind project has not been the subject of a nuisance suit, the 
 
 
note 112. As opposed to aesthetics, light historically has been a ground for a nuisance claim. See supra 
text accompanying note 127. 
 154. The court found emotional response only supported a claim where there is a nuisance per se. 
See supra text accompanying note 131. Although the wind farm in Rankin was clearly legal, Rankin, 
226 S.W.3d at 511, it is conceivable that there could be an illegal wind generator, such as one in 
violation of zoning laws, and then emotional response to its aesthetics may support a nuisance claim. 
See id. at 511–12. Although, if it were violating zoning laws, other recourse would be available. See, 
e.g., supra note 72.  
 155. POWELL, supra note 31, § 64.04(4) (footnotes omitted). 
 156. See Stone & Zdeb, supra note 19, at 5. 
 157. See, e.g., Elaine Smith, Danger—Inequality of Resources Present: Can the Environmental 
Mediation Process Provide an Effective Answer?, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 379, 383 (―[T]he median 
duration of environmental litigation from filing to disposition was ten months, extending to 23 months 
if the case went to trial.‖).  
 158. For a thorough discussion of the early rounds of litigation facing the Cape Wind project, see 
Smith, supra note 19, at 284–90. 
 159. The issues litigated included whether the Massachusetts Department of Environmental 
Protection and Massachusetts Department of Environmental Management needed to issue permits for 
construction and whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers properly issued a permit to construct a 
wind-monitoring tower. See id. at 286–88. In the face of this litigation, ―Cape Wind has . . . prevailed 
in every hearing before a federal agency and won every case in the federal courts . . . .‖ Id. at 289.  
 160. See id. at 284; see also Jim Efstathiou Jr., Salazar Signs Cape Wind Lease, First for U.S. 
Waters, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-06/ 
salazar-signs-cape-wind-lease-first-for-u-s-waters.html. In October 2010, the Secretary of the Interior, 
Ken Salazar, signed a twenty-eight-year lease with the developer of the Cape Wind Project, a step 
toward its construction; however, opponents of the development still have five pending lawsuits 
against the project. Id. 
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ability of its opponents to delay its development is illustrative of the effect 
litigation can have on wind development. 
In addition to being a slow process, litigation is expensive.
161
 It is 
estimated that Fortune 500 companies spend $210 billion on litigation, 
―equivalent to one-third of . . . after-tax profit[s].‖162 The money wind 
energy developers spend in litigation inevitably increases the cost of the 
overall project and decreases the cost efficiency of wind generation.
163
 As 
noted, wind energy has the potential to significantly reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and our dependence on foreign oil,
164
 so anything which 
serves to needlessly delay or increase wind energy‘s costs, as nuisance 
litigation can, is a social harm and generally should be avoided. 
V. PROPOSAL 
This part moves forward from the general premise that nuisance 
litigation against wind farms and wind generators is often a social harm 
and advances a proposal to minimize that harm.
165
 Another commentator 
has suggested that courts should address this issue by generally following 
the Rankin court‘s reasoning, liberally dismissing suits at the pleading 
stage, and considering monetary damages in lieu of equitable remedies.
166
 
 
 
 161. See, e.g., Stone & Zdeb, supra note 19, at 5. 
 162. John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost of Litigation Estimated at One-Third Profits, 
METRO. CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2008, at 28, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2008/ 
February/28.pdf. 
 163. The developer of wind energy presumably pays litigation expenses by passing on the cost to 
the consumer, increasing the cost of the product—energy produced by wind. Cf. Gwyn Goodson 
Timms, Note, Statutorily Awarding Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Nuisance Suits: Jump Starting 
the Public Watchdog, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733, 1758 (1992) (―[D]efendants in pollution [nuisance] 
suits are huge corporations that can write off litigation costs or pass them on to the shareholders and 
consumers as a cost of doing business.‖). 
 164. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
 165. Clearly, as cases like Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982), 
demonstrate, nuisance claims are sometimes meritorious and deserving of judicial intervention. See 
supra Part III.A.1. 
 166. See Stephen Harland Butler, Headwinds to a Clean Energy Future: Nuisance Suits Against 
Wind Energy Projects in the United States, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1337, 1364, 1373–74 (2009). Butler 
breaks down his recommendations for how courts should evaluate these cases based on the type of 
claim alleged. With regard to noise, he takes a rather aggressive stance, arguing that ―[r]ather than 
forc[ing] every wind developer facing a wind suit to go to trial over noise concerns, future courts 
should consider a standard for noise claims that allows the dismissal of claims that clearly lack merit.‖ 
Id. at 1366. However, he argues ―[a] jury should have the chance to make the final determination if 
there appears to be a chance that the wind development would be close enough to a residential area to 
cause substantial amounts of noise.‖ Id. at 1367. With regard to aesthetic claims, he believes courts 
should reject the logic followed in Burch v. NedPower Mount Storm, and reject claims based either 
entirely or partially on aesthetic concerns. Id. at 1369. In addition, Butler argues that as an alternative 
to enjoining construction of the socially desirable wind farms, ―courts should consider whether 
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Such a solution is inadequate because by the time the court hears the case, 
wind development has already been slowed and its costs increased.
167
 My 
proposal goes further and immunizes wind developers from the costs and 
delays of nuisance litigation, while preserving the protections such 
litigation affords neighboring property owners.
168
 Before explaining the 
proposal, this Note discusses right-to-farm legislation as an example of 
nuisance immunity.
169
 
A. Right-to-Farm Legislation as a Model? 
Currently, all fifty states have right-to-farm statutes,
170
 which serve as 
an imperfect model to a possible solution to nuisance-based litigation 
against wind farms. 
 A typical Right-to-Farm Act provides that an agricultural 
operation or activity shall not be considered a nuisance if the 
nuisance derives from changed conditions in the area surrounding 
the operation and if the operation was established first and operated 
for a defined period of time . . . before the change in conditions 
occurred. In this sense, the Acts are merely a codification of the 
common law‘s coming to the nuisance doctrine.171  
Most of these statutes were passed in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of 
urban sprawl and a desire to protect agricultural producers from new 
neighbors who objected to living so close to agricultural production.
172
  
 
 
monetary damages or other compensation to the plaintiff neighboring landowners might best 
ameliorate the plaintiffs‘ alleged harm while also preserving the social utility of a wind project.‖ Id. at 
1374.  
 167. See supra Part IV.B. In her concluding remarks on the subject, another commentator agrees 
that nuisance litigation is an inappropriate solution to the conflict between wind developers and 
neighbors. Culley, supra note 117, at 972. However, Culley‘s sympathies seem to be with the 
dissatisfied neighbors rather than with the advancement of wind development. See id. at 943. She 
suggests that ―the wind energy industry should work more collaboratively with the local communities 
and the government on zoning, permitting and proper siting of the turbines.‖ Id. at 972. 
 168. See infra Part V.B. 
 169. See infra Part V.A. 
 170. See Pittman, supra note 52, at 480. 
 171. Id. at 481. 
 172. Id. at 480. The following findings and purpose of the Florida Right to Farm Act describe the 
sentiment of Florida‘s legislature in enacting the statute: 
The Legislature finds that agricultural production is a major contributor to the economy of the 
state; that agricultural lands constitute unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide 
importance; that the continuation of agricultural activities preserves the landscape and 
environmental resources of the state, contributes to the increase of tourism, and furthers the 
economic self-sufficiency of the people of the state; and that the encouragement, 
development, improvement, and preservation of agriculture will result in a general benefit to 
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Most wind producers would not benefit from an immunity analogous to 
the one created by right-to-farm statutes. Since right-to-farm statutes are 
based on the common-law doctrine of coming to the nuisance,
173
 only 
preexisting wind generators or wind farms would benefit from an 
analogous statute.
174
 Thus, defendants like those in Rassier would be 
protected from future neighbors objecting to their wind generators.
175
 
However, such a statute would do nothing to address the increased costs 
and delays that nuisance litigation causes new developers of wind 
energy.
176
 
B. Proposal 
States should adopt ―right-to-wind‖ statutes. These statutes would 
combine a typical license statute with immunity from nuisance suits.
177
 A 
Manitowoc County, Wisconsin, ordinance provides a good model for how 
the permit portion of the right-to-wind statute should be constructed.
178
 To 
 
 
the health and welfare of the people of the state. The Legislature further finds that agricultural 
activities conducted on farm land in urbanizing areas are potentially subject to lawsuits based 
on the theory of nuisance and that these suits encourage and even force the premature 
removal of the farm land from agricultural use. It is the purpose of this act to protect 
reasonable agricultural activities conducted on farm land from nuisance suits. 
Florida Right to Farm Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(2) (West 2006). 
 173. See supra Part I.D. 
 174. The right-to-farm statutes usually require the farm to exist and be operational for at least a 
year before the statutory protection will apply. Pittman, supra note 52. Presumably, some similar 
minimum would be required for wind protection. 
 175. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 157, 161. 
 177. The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act defines a ―license‖ as ―a franchise, 
permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by law.‖ 
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(4) (1981). 
 178. See Large Wind Energy System Ordinance, MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24 (2007). 
The ordinance has been the subject of some criticism due to the restrictiveness of its requirements. For 
instance, the ordinance requires a minimum set back of ―1.1 times the total height of the . . . wind 
system . . . from any public road or power line,‖ as well as ―at least 1,000 feet from the property line of 
a nonparticipating [neighboring] property.‖ Id. § 24.06(2). In the words of a Wisconsin wind advocate, 
―if every jurisdiction adopted Manitowoc County‘s setback standards, there would not be a single 
commercial wind project operating in Wisconsin right now.‖ Manitowoc County Says No to Wind 
Project, HERALD TIMES REP. (Manitowoc, Wis.), Jan. 23, 2009, at 5A. However, the Board of 
Adjustment, which approves applications for new wind development, has allowed ―variances‖ to these 
setback requirements in the past and faced litigation from citizens upset with the less restrictive 
setbacks. See Roberts v. Manitowoc Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 721 N.W.2d 499, 504–05 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2006) (upholding the Board‘s approval of the application, and its right to issue the ―variances‖). 
In addition, the maximum noise level restriction seems excessively burdensome. The ordinance states 
that ―[t]he noise generated by the operation of a large wind energy system may not exceed the ambient 
noise level by more than 5 dB(A) as measured at any point on property adjacent to the parcel on 
which‖ the wind generator is located. MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24.06(14)(a). Five decibels 
is very insignificant, less than the sound of normal breathing, which is 10 decibels. Interactive Sound 
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obtain the permit, wind developers would have to meet a number of 
requirements meant to ensure that the wind farm or generator would not 
become a nuisance to nearby property owners. These requirements would 
include minimum setbacks from neighboring parcels and structures, 
minimum safety requirements and precautions, and maximum noise 
levels.
179
 Once compliance with the requirements is met, an appropriate 
state agency would conduct a public hearing, after proper notice and 
within a short amount of time.
180
 Such an administrative hearing would 
allow any neighbor who has objections to the proposed wind farm or wind 
generator to raise those objections and present evidence as to why the 
statutory minimum guidelines would be insufficient in that situation.
181
 
After the hearing, the agency would determine whether the applicant had 
met the minimum statutory requirements and whether the proposed wind 
farm would unreasonably interfere with the use and enjoyment of any 
neighbors‘ property.182 If the applicant met the statutory requirements and 
did not unreasonably interfere, the license would be granted, and the wind 
 
 
Ruler, supra note 70. Such an insignificant difference as measured from the property line, not even a 
structure or inside a structure, seems unnecessarily burdensome. 
 179. MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24.06. The Manitowoc County Code suggests other 
potential requirements, including: maximum height; minimum clearance between the ground and the 
blades; fenced-off access ladders; underground electric lines; ―nonreflective, neutral color‖; and 
compliance with all federal laws including FAA lighting requirements. Id. The specific requirements 
of any right-to-wind statute would require extensive study and policy judgments by legislators to strike 
the appropriate balance between protecting neighbors from unwelcome interference with their use and 
enjoyment of their property and creating realistic and not overly burdensome standards for developers 
of wind energy. Indeed, the drafting of the Manitowoc County ordinance took an advisory committee a 
year. Kristopher Wenn, Board Passes Wind Energy Rules, HERALD TIMES REP. (Manitowoc, Wis.), 
Apr. 13, 2006, at 1A. Despite this well-researched ordinance, some wind advocates view its setback 
requirements as overly burdensome. See supra note 178.  
 180. For instance, the Manitowoc County ordinance requires the Board of Adjustment conduct a 
hearing ―within sixty days after . . . receiv[ing] the completed application.‖ MANITOWOC COUNTY, 
WIS., CODE § 24.08(2). Again, the amount of time before a hearing must be held is a matter for a 
legislature to decide. Determining the time frame requires weighing the general public and wind 
developer‘s interest in obtaining a permit as quickly as possible against giving any neighbors who 
object a reasonable amount of time to research and adequately prepare a statement against granting the 
right-to-wind license. 
 181. Although I hesitate to speculate on what type of situation may lead the statutory minimum 
protections to be insufficient, one can imagine a situation in which the unique geological nature of the 
area may require more stringent standards than those outlined in the statute. For instance, if the 
proposed wind farm were on a hill above the plaintiff‘s property, it could conceivably create unusually 
bothersome strobe effects that normally would be insignificant with the minimum setback requirement.  
 182. The Manitowoc County ordinance has a slightly different formulation: ―The Board will grant 
a . . . permit if it determines that the requirements of this ordinance are met and that granting the 
permit will not unreasonably interfere with the orderly land use and development plans of the county.‖ 
MANITOWOC COUNTY, WIS., CODE § 24.08(3).  
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developer would become immune from nuisance litigation for the licensed 
project. This immunity would provide an absolute defense to nuisance 
litigation,
183
 so long as the wind farm or generator complied with the terms 
of the license.
184
 Parties could appeal administratively either the granting 
or withholding of the license,
185
 but judicial review should be specifically 
precluded by statute.
186
 
By having the administrative agency consider the effect on the 
neighbor, including potential nuisance issues, before the granting of the 
license and immunity, several goals would be accomplished. First, and 
foremost, the wind developer could proceed with the construction of the 
wind farm or wind generator without fear of increased costs or delays from 
nuisance suits.
187
 Second, the rights of the neighbor would be preserved. 
 
 
 183. The absolute defense is necessary to deter people from bringing nuisance suits against wind 
farms. Only certain right-to-farm statutes provide an absolute defense from nuisance suits. See Randall 
Wayne Hanna, Comment, “Right to Farm” Statutes—The Newest Tool in Agricultural Land 
Preservation, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 433 (1982). The Mississippi statute is an example of one 
that does provide an absolute defense: ―In any nuisance action, public or private, against an 
agricultural operation, including forestry activity, proof that the agricultural operation, including 
forestry activity, has existed for one (1) year or more is an absolute defense to the nuisance action 
. . . .‖ MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (Supp. 2010); Hanna, supra, at 433. By comparison, the 
Vermont statute does not provide an absolute defense, but ―[a]gricultural activities [are] entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption that the activity does not constitute a nuisance . . . .‖ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 5753 (Supp. 2010); Hanna, supra, at 433–34. If the right-to-wind statute only granted wind-energy 
producers a rebuttable presumption that the activity does not constitute a nuisance, it would leave 
greater room for litigants to challenge their development in court.  
 184. Similarly, even though it is deemed an ―absolute defense,‖ the Mississippi statute is 
qualified, only granting the defense ―if the [agricultural] operation is in compliance with all applicable 
state and federal permits.‖ MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (Supp. 2010). 
 185. The administrative appeals would follow the applicable state agency‘s appeal process. Many 
states have designated appeals boards for hearing appeals of state agency action. See, e.g., OHIO 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW APPEALS COMMISSION, http://erac.ohio.gov/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 186. If judicial review were not precluded by statute, then many of the advantages of having the 
process in the administrative realm would be lost if a dissatisfied neighbor could appeal the agency 
determination through the court system. However, ―states vary considerably in their approach to 
preclusion of judicial review.‖ MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 625 (3d ed. 2009). For instance, Connecticut‘s and Kansas‘s legislatures may 
preclude judicial review in any circumstance, but New York does not allow preclusion of review if the 
agency acted improperly. Id. ―In Indiana and New Jersey, apparently no limits can be placed on the 
right of judicial review.‖ Id. If a right-to-wind statute were passed in one of those states, it would lose 
some of its efficacy if dissatisfied neighbors sought to appeal the granting of the license. However, the 
licensing hearing would still give neighbors an outlet to voice their concern about a proposed wind 
farm without resorting to nuisance litigation as the first option. 
 187. Although the license application process would certainly take time and money, it would 
likely be less than nuisance litigation. For instance, the Manitowoc County ordinance requires a 
hearing within sixty days of application. See supra note 180. By contrast, the median length of time 
from filing to disposition of personal injury or property damage cases in Wisconsin circuit courts was 
363 days in 2008. WIS. CT. SYS., AGE AT DISPOSITION SUMMARY: STATEWIDE REPORT (2008), 
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/about/pubs/circuit/docs/agedispostate08.pdf. This does not 
include the average of 242 days between a notice of appeal and an opinion in the Wisconsin Court of 
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Even though the neighbor would no longer have the right to sue based on 
nuisance, the licensing requirements and consideration by the agency of 
possible interference in the use and enjoyment of the neighbor‘s property 
would provide adequate protection for the neighbor with a legitimate 
nuisance claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The development of wind energy is a national priority. Wind energy 
has the potential to reduce carbon emissions and slow the effects of 
climate change and also has the potential to reduce our dependence on 
foreign sources of energy.
188
 Given the importance of wind energy and its 
potential to address some of the most fundamental challenges facing the 
United States, anything that needlessly prevents its development is a social 
harm. Litigation, especially based in nuisance law, can be one such 
obstacle to the development of wind energy. Nuisance suits against wind 
farms or generators can be made on several grounds, and the most 
successful in the past have been based on noise.
189
 These suits, whether 
ultimately successful or not, serve to delay and increase the cost of wind 
energy development and are therefore contrary to public interest. 
However, when a landowner brings a suit in nuisance, he or she does so to 
preserve his or her ―interest in the private use and enjoyment of [his or 
her] land.‖190 My proposed right-to-wind legislation advances the public 
interest by eliminating nuisance litigation against wind development, 
while preserving the right of nearby landowners to enjoy their land. By 
creating a clear set of requirements for wind developers to obtain a 
license—which carries immunity from nuisance litigation—the 
neighbor‘s, the developer‘s, and the public‘s interests are advanced. The 
neighbor is protected by the minimum statutory requirements for the 
license, as well as the agency‘s consideration of whether the proposed 
development would interfere with the neighbor‘s use and enjoyment of the 
land. The developer knows from the outset what is required of it and faces 
less uncertainty, cost, and delay from potential nuisance litigation. Finally, 
the public benefits from the faster and more cost-effective development of 
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wind energy and the corresponding reduction in greenhouse gases and 
negative effects of climate change.  
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